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THE KNOTTIEST PROBLEM: UNRAVELING ARISING
UNDER JURISDICTION IN COPYRIGHT CASES
Zoe Nieset & Bethany A. Corbin-
INTRODUCTION
The convoluted field of copyright jurisdiction is perceived today as
one of the "knottiest" dilemmas in procedural history.' Born from a mixture
of statutory law and judicial interpretation, copyright jurisdiction has
spawned numerous appeals, conflicting tests, and confusion for litigants.
The creation of a fair, bright-line framework for copyright jurisdiction has
evaded the courts, and litigants are left with hastily developed rules and
arbitrary application. Against this backdrop, it is perhaps unsurprising that
federal question jurisdiction, and its intersection with copyright, has been
labeled "the most difficult problem in determining whether a case arises
under federal law for statutory purposes. '"2
The reasons for this jurisdictional conundrum come from several
sources. First, the parameters of arising under jurisdiction in general have
proven difficult to delineate. Initially born from the language of Article III,
Section 2 of the Constitution,3 the concept of "arising under" has bifurcated
into analyses premised on either (1) the type of law that creates the cause of
action or (2) whether the resolution of the lawsuit will implicate an "em-
* Adjunct Professor of Law, Wake Forest University; Attorney, Kilpatrick Townsend & Stock-
ton, LLP; Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, Wake Forest University (2013-2015).
Adjunct Professor of Law, Wake Forest University; J.D. 2013, Wake Forest University School
of Law; B.A. 2011, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
1 Scandinavian Satellite Sys., AS v. Prime TV Ltd., 291 F.3d 839, 844 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (quoting
3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 12.01 [A] (2002)) (internal quo-
tation marks omitted).
2 13D CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3562, at 175 (3d
ed. 2008); see also Amy B. Cohen, "'Arising Under" Jurisdiction and the Copyright Laws, 44
HASTINGS L.J. 337, 337-40 (1993) ("Unfortunately, [the] precedents [describing the scope of copyright
jurisdiction] are so unclear that the question of when a case arises under federal law has been described
as 'the most difficult single problem in determining whether federal question jurisdiction exists."' (quot-
ing 13B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3562, at 17 (2d ed.
1984))); Brandon Beam, Comment, Untangling Jurisdiction and Contract Scope Issues with Intellectual
Property Licenses, 34 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 391, 406 (2012) ("Modem courts and commenta-
tors have yet to resolve the issue of how to determine whether a claim arises under the federal copyright
laws. This issue 'poses among the knottiest procedural problems in copyright jurisprudence."' (quoting
3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 1, § 12.01[A], at 124)).
3 U.S. CONST. art. Ill, § 2, cl. 1.
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bedded ... federal issue."4 The first category of cases is relatively easy to
define-these involve causes of actions that are created by federal law. For
example, federal law allows a cause of action for employment discrimina-
tion based on race; as such, a complaint alleging employment discrimina-
tion and seeking remedies for such clearly enjoys federal question jurisdic-
tion.' In contrast, the second category of arising under jurisdiction has been
slower to develop and more difficult to articulate. While the case law has
always embraced the notion that some federal question jurisdiction should
exist outside federal causes of action,6 the United States Supreme Court has
been less certain in developing the factual context in which jurisdiction
premised on embedded federal issues should exist.
Unfortunately, the dilemma of copyright jurisdiction has proven fertile
ground for revealing the gaps in this second path of the Court's bifurcated
analysis. A quick example makes this exceptionally clear. Causes of action
created by the Copyright Act7 easily fall within the ambit of federal juris-
diction. So, for example, an action alleging copyright infringement arises
under federal law because federal law creates the cause of action itself.8
However, disputes over copyrights take more forms than just garden-variety
copyright infringement actions. For example, copyright owners frequently
make contracts that assign rights, use, or ownership of certain copyrights.
When these contracts are breached, the cause of action can take the form of
breach of contract. While such a cause of action is not created by federal
law, it is another question entirely whether the plaintiff can avoid federal
subject matter jurisdiction by couching his action as a breach of contract
and deciding not to allege copyright infringement.
This Article seeks to elucidate the following related question: when
should actions involving copyright issues, even if they do not allege copy-
right infringement, be subject to the jurisdiction of the federal courts? It is a
question that has been grappled with before,9 but the increasing importance
4 Dillon v. Medtronic, Inc., 992 F. Supp. 2d 751, 755-56 (E.D. Ky. 2014).
5 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2012).
6 See, e.g., Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Tr., 463 U.S. 1, 9 (1983) (noting how
the Supreme Court has consistently recognized federal jurisdiction, even where the cause of action is
under a state law); Smith v. Kan. City Title & Tr. Co., 255 U.S. 180, 199-202 (1921) (holding that
jurisdiction was proper where the cause of action arose under state law, but the ultimate issue was a
constitutional one).
7 17U.S.C.§§ 101-810 (2012).
8 See Integrated Sols., Inc. v. Serv. Support Specialties, Inc., 193 B.R. 722, 727 (D.N.J. 1996)
("Although copyright infringement is fundamentally a tort... it arises under federal law ...."); see also
Datatech Enters. LLC v. FF Magnat Ltd., No. C 12-4500 CRB, 2013 WL 1283439, at *2 (N.D. Cal.
Mar. 26, 2013) ("Copyright infringement cases arise under federal law .... ).
9 See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 2, at 337-39; Craig Y. Allison, Note, Does A Copyright Coowner's
Duty to Account Arise Under Federal Law?, 90 MiCH. L. REv. 1998, 1998 (1992); Christopher D.
Birrer, Note, A Jurisdictional "Nightmare": Determining When an Interdependent Copyright and Con-
tract Claim "Arises Under" the Copyright Act in Scholastic Entertainment, Inc. v. Fox Entertainment
Group, Inc., II VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 271, 272-73 (2004); Jay S. Fleischman, Comment, Swimming
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of copyright issues in modem society suggests that leaving this area in a
tangle will only grow increasingly problematic. Further, an examination of
this question reveals that plaintiffs have an extraordinary amount of control
in avoiding the federal forum when copyright issues become entangled with
state law causes of action. At the risk of writing a how-to guide for what
might be categorized as jurisdictional gamesmanship, this Article will ex-
plore how the current state of copyright jurisdiction allows plaintiffs an
extraordinary amount of control in avoiding federal jurisdiction at the ex-
pense of the theoretical underpinnings of arising under jurisdiction.
To explore these issues, Part I examines the grant of federal jurisdic-
tion under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 " and § 1338," and thus ascertains the history
of arising under jurisdiction in the context of embedded federal questions
and the copyright context. Specifically, Part I explores the evolution of
three separate copyright tests and details the present status of copyright
jurisdiction, as dominated by the well-pleaded complaint rule. Part II then
analyzes the practical implications and setbacks associated with applying
the well-pleaded complaint rule to federal jurisdiction under § 1338. In par-
ticular, it details why a plaintiff may seek to prevent removal to federal
court and how a plaintiff can craftily maneuver the allegations in her com-
plaint to defeat federal jurisdiction.
Part III sets forth a proposal to remedy the downfalls of the well-
pleaded complaint rule in the context of copyright actions, advocating for
two simple changes to the well-pleaded complaint rule. First, courts should
refrain from undertaking a jurisdictional analysis until after a defendant
files her answer. Second, courts should examine both the complaint and
answer to determine whether a case involves construction of the Copyright
Act. If the case requires analysis or interpretation of the Copyright Act,
jurisdiction should be vested in the federal courts.
the Murky Waters: The Second Circuit and Subject-Matter Jurisdiction in Copyright Infringement Cases
From T.B. Harms v. Eliscu to Schoenberg v. Shapolsky Publishers, Inc., 42 BUFF. L. REv. 119, 120-21
(1994); James M. McCarthy, Comment, Federal Subject Matter Jurisdiction: When Does A Case In-
volving the Breach of A Copyright Licensing Contract "Arise Under" the Copyright Act?, 19 U.
DAYTON L. REv. 165, 166-68 (1993); David Ratner, Survey, The Ongoing Struggle to Determine Fed-
eral "Arising Under" Jurisdiction in Copyright: The Complete Preemption Exception to the Well
Pleaded Complaint Rule, 84 DENV. U. L. REV. 955, 955-56 (2007).
10 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2012).
11 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (2012).
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I. THE STATUTORY PROVISIONS: FEDERAL QUESTION JURISDICTION
AND COPYRIGHT
A. Federal Question Jurisdiction and § 1331
Any discussion of federal question jurisdiction must begin with its
constitutional origins in Article III, Section 2. Pursuant to that section, the
Framers granted the federal courts jurisdiction over "Cases, in Law and
Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and
Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority.' 2 Although
conceptualized as a mechanism to ensure the consistent application of fed-
eral law and to prevent unfortunate consequences of state court hostility to
federal legislation, 3 federal question jurisdiction was withheld from the
lower courts until Congress provided statutory authorization in the period
following the Civil War.'4 To ensure that Southern state courts did not evis-
cerate federal Reconstruction legislation, Congress passed the predecessor
statute to modem § 1331. The language of the statutory grant of federal
question jurisdiction has remained relatively consistent since that time, with
the key analysis being whether the civil action in question was one "arising
under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made,
or which shall be made, under their Authority."' 5
Despite its 140-year history, the meaning of the phrase "arising under"
has never been entirely clear. Although no bright-line can be articulated,
analyses of arising under jurisdiction have been guided by various princi-
ples established by the Supreme Court. The basic operating principle that
guides an analysis under § 1331 is the well-pleaded complaint rule, which
is generally associated with Louisville & Nashville Railroad v. Mottley. 6
An in-depth discussion of Mottley would be repetitive-the case is a com-
mon fixture in all civil procedure textbooks. However, its basic facts are
worth reciting.
12 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
13 See generally Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (I Wheat.) 304,347-48 (1816) (discussing the
consequences of the Supreme Court not having the ability to review federal issues).
14 See Vest v. Schafer, 757 P.2d 588, 592 (Alaska 1988) ("Dissatisfied with this reliance on state
courts, during the Reconstruction Era following the Civil War, Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of
1871 and bestowed general federal question jurisdiction on lower federal courts several years later."
(footnote omitted)); Allen v. Okla. City, 52 P.2d 1054, 1057 (Okla. 1935) ("The federal question grew
out of the Civil War ... ").
15 U.S. CONST. art. 11I, § 2.
16 211 U.S. 149 (1908); see also Mark J. Henry, State Courts Hearing Patent Cases: A Cry for
Help to the Federal Circuit, 101 DICK. L. REv. 41,45-46 (1996) ("The 1908 Supreme Court decision of
Louisville & Nashville Railroad v. Mottley is closely associated with the interpretation of the jurisdic-




The plaintiffs brought a claim in federal court after the defendant,
Louisville & Nashville Railroad, canceled lifetime rail passes the plaintiffs
had acquired after settling a previous negligence claim with the railroad. 7
The plaintiffs sued the railroad for specific performance in an attempt to
have their rail passes reinstated. 8 In the complaint, the plaintiffs preemp-
tively addressed a defense likely to be raised by the defendant-namely,
that a federal statute, the Hepburn Act, now prohibited the railroad from
honoring agreements that provided certain individuals with free travel on
the railroad. 9 The complaint thus asserted that the Hepburn Act did not
apply to the plaintiffs' passes, and, even if it did, the statute was unconstitu-
tional in the context of free rail passes obtained in exchange for release
from a negligence claim."
The Supreme Court ultimately determined that the Mottley's com-
plaint failed to arise under federal laws pursuant to § 1331. The Court's
analysis was based on what is now known as the well-pleaded complaint
rule, which stipulates that only the well-pleaded portions of the plaintiff's
complaint necessary to state a claim could be considered in assessing
whether federal question jurisdiction was appropriate.2 ' Accordingly, any
anticipated defenses or responses to anticipated defenses would not serve as
the basis for arising under jurisdiction.2
Applied to the facts of the Mottley case, it is easy to see the well-
pleaded complaint rule in action. It was apodictic in Mottley that a court
would eventually have to address an issue of federal law. The railroad was
certain to raise the Hepburn Act as a defense, and any court hearing the suit
would have to determine the application and constitutionality of this federal
statute. But, regardless, the fact that an analysis of federal law would actu-
ally occur in the lawsuit alone would not serve as the basis for federal juris-
diction. The Mottley's action was ultimately for breach of contract, and any
treatment of the Hepburn Act fell outside the well-pleaded portion of the
complaint necessary to state that claim.23 Thus, even if the only issue in the
case is one of federal law, arising under jurisdiction is not guaranteed.
Mottley and its well-pleaded complaint rule establish the first step in
any analysis under § 1331: culling the complaint to its well-pleaded allega-
tions. It is only at this point that a search can begin for arising under juris-
diction. Therefore, in the absence of any competing federal legislation,
counterclaims, defenses, and anticipated defenses fail to contribute to the
existence of federal jurisdiction.
17 Mottley, 211 U.S. at 150.
18 Id.
19 Id. at 150-51.
20 Id.
21 Id. at 153.
22 Id. at 152-53.
23 Mottley, 211 U.S. at 152-53.
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Once the Mottley analysis is employed, it becomes necessary to search
the remaining allegations for the seeds of federal question jurisdiction. It is
here that arising under jurisdiction bifurcates based on whether (1) federal
law creates the cause of action or (2) state law creates the cause of action
but the suit implicates a substantial federal question. The first path is by far
the more simple and mechanical of the two. First articulated by Justice
Holmes in American Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co.,24 the first
branch of arising under jurisdiction assesses if the suit "arises under the law
that creates the cause of action."25 Accordingly, if the plaintiffs claim is
created by federal law, it arises under federal law for purposes of § 1331.26
This test can fairly be said to embrace the vast majority of cases that are
candidates for arising under jurisdiction.
Although the so-called "Holmes test" proves easy to apply, in applica-
tion it precludes any case that does not achieve its cause of action from fed-
eral law. Accordingly, the Holmes test occasionally departs from what has
been coined "litigation reality. '27 In these instances, the Holmes test rejects
federal jurisdiction when the cause of action arises under state law but im-
plicates a question of federal law on which the case will turn.28 This result
might reflect a misguided policy choice about the availability of federal
question jurisdiction. There is no indication that the cause of action should
dogmatically set the parameters of arising under jurisdiction. If it did, aris-
ing under jurisdiction would be converted to federal creation jurisdiction-
and such a choice would embrace a policy of providing a federal forum
only for the causes of action shaped by federal law.
But this is not the case, as the Court has previously referenced federal
question jurisdiction in broader policy terms by stating that the goal of the
doctrine is to "resort to the experience, solicitude, and hope of uniformity"
of the federal court for the interpretation of federal law.29 The reality is that
federal questions can appear in cases even when the creation test fails. Ac-
cordingly, a second branch of federal question jurisdiction has developed to
establish arising under jurisdiction when federal law does not create the
claim. This competing doctrine has become known as the "substantial fed-
eral question" doctrine.
24 241 U.S. 257 (1916).
25 Id. at 260.
26 See id,
27 Richard D. Freer, Of Rules and Standards: Reconciling Statutory Limitations on "Arising
Under" Jurisdiction, 82 IND. L.J. 309,321 (2007).
28 See id.
29 Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng'g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 312 (2005).
30 See Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Tr., 463 U.S. 1, 9 (1983); Mikulski v.




The first stirrings of the substantial federal question doctrine come
from Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co.3 In Smith, a shareholder
sought to enjoin the defendant from investing in federal bonds that he as-
serted were unconstitutional. 2 The cause of action arose, without question,
under a state law that disallowed investment in illegal securities.3 Accord-
ingly, the Holmes test would indicate a lack of federal question jurisdiction.
The Court, over Justice Holmes's dissent, disagreed. The majority instead
determined that the ultimate issue in the case was the constitutionality of
the bonds identified by the plaintiff.34 The Court did not identify any over-
arching policy reason for its deviation from the Holmes test, but one seems
clear nonetheless. If the only real issue within the well-pleaded complaint
was one of federal law (i.e., the constitutionality of the bonds), then surely
the issue was one for the federal forum.
The Court continued its march against mechanical applications of fed-
eral question jurisdiction in Gully v. First National Bank in Meridian.35
Gully involved a national bank that went into receivership and transferred
its rights and liabilities to another bank. 6 The transferee bank then failed to
pay state taxes on the shares of stock of the predecessor bank, resulting in a
suit by state officials to collect the taxes.37 The transferee bank removed the
action to federal court and apparently argued that federal question jurisdic-
tion existed because the court would need to determine whether the prede-
cessor national bank was subject to state taxes.3" The Supreme Court deter-
mined, perhaps unsurprisingly, that the action did not arise under federal
law for the purposes of§ 133 1.3
But the reason why that decision was reached is more interesting than
the end result. In assessing the presence of a federal question, the Court did
apply the Holmes test, but it tempered that application by noting that a more
delicate analysis was necessary. Specifically, Justice Cardozo noted the
"futil[ity] [of the] attempt to define a 'cause of action' without reference to
the context."4 In that vein, a "common-sense accommodation of judgment"
was necessary to characterize the types of cases that would fall within the
ambit of federal question jurisdiction.4 The Court further referenced what
would come to be known as the substantial federal question doctrine by
noting the need to "pick[] the substantial causes out of the web and lay[] the
31 255 U.S. 180 (1921).
32 Id. at 195.
33 Id. at201.
34 See id. at 199-202, 210, 213.
35 299 U.S. 109 (1936).
36 Id. at 111.
37 ld. at 112.
38 id.
39 ld. at 114.
40 Id. at 117 (quoting United States v. Memphis Cotton Oil Co., 288 U.S. 62, 67, 68 (1933)).
41 Gully, 299 U.S. at 17.
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other ones aside" in determining the existence of federal question jurisdic-
tion.42 Thus, although the federal issue was only "lurking in the back-
ground" in Gully,4 3 the Court continued its move away from mechanical or
rigid applications, 6 la the Holmes test.
While Gully indicated a subtle recognition of the substantial federal
question doctrine, the Court's next case, Franchise Tax Board v. Construc-
tion Laborers Vacation Trust,' announced the principle with relative force.
Franchise Tax Board involved a state agency that collected state taxes in
conflict with a trust that gave construction workers paid time off pursuant to
a collective bargaining agreement.45 When several construction workers
were delinquent in their state taxes, the tax board sought to collect the pay-
ment owed from the trust. The trust argued that the federal Employment
Retirement and Income Security Act preempted state law that would allow
collection of taxes from the trust, thus allegedly creating a federal ques-
tion.46
The Supreme Court ultimately rejected jurisdiction in Franchise Tax
Board.47 But in doing so, the Court noted that the Holmes creation test was
only one branch of arising under jurisdiction, and an equally valid branch of
analysis arose from assessing the presence of federal issues embedded with-
in causes of action that were created by state law. 8 As such, any suggestion
that the Holmes test was exclusionary was henceforth discarded. Instead, a
plaintiff could establish federal jurisdiction by showing that he would be
"obliged to establish both the correctness and the applicability to his case of
a proposition of federal law."49 Of course, this analysis would remain lim-
ited by the well-pleaded complaint rule. As such, only if the well-pleaded
allegations of the plaintiff's compliant revealed a need to establish a propo-
sition of federal law could the second branch of federal question jurisdic-
tion be accessed. But if the "plaintiff's right to relief necessarily depends on
resolution of a substantial question of federal law," arising under jurisdic-
tion should be secure despite failure of the Holmes creation test.5 0
Following another wave of related analysis in Merrell Dow Pharma-
ceuticals, Inc. v. Thompson,5 the Court returned to the development of the
42 Id. at 118.
43 Id. at 11l7.
44 463 U.S. 1 (1983).
45 Id. at 4-5.
46 Id. at 5-6.
47 Id. at 28.
48 Id. at 8-9.
49 Id. at 9 (quoting PAUL M. BATOR ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 889 (2d ed. 1973)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
50 Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at28.
51 478 U.S. 804 (1986). In Merrell Dow, residents of Canada and Scotland filed complaints
against Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. in Hamilton County, Ohio. Id. at 805. The plaintiffs claimed
that Merrell Dow engaged in negligence, fraud, breach of warranty, and misbranding in violation of the
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substantial federal question doctrine in Grable & Sons v. Darue Engineer-
ing & Manufacturing.2 The Grable Court revitalized Smith and clarified
that state law claims involving federal issues could be candidates for arising
under jurisdiction. 3 Accordingly, the Court in Grable was willing to find
federal question jurisdiction in a state law action to quiet title in which it
was claimed that the defendant's title was invalid because the IRS had
failed to give the plaintiff proper notice of a previous tax seizure and sale. 4
In making this determination, the Court recognized that several factors
would inform the question." Specifically, if (1) the case necessarily raises a
federal issue, (2) that issue is in dispute and is substantial to federal law,
and (3) an exercise of arising under jurisdiction does not disturb the balance
between the state and federal fora, federal question jurisdiction will be ap-
propriate. 6
Grable and the long history of substantial federal question jurisdiction
signify two noteworthy points. First, arising under jurisdiction requires a
subtle analysis-it is not amendable to inflexible or dogmatic rules. This is
why the Holmes creation test gives way to the substantial federal question
doctrine. Second, the reason for this liberalization resonates with the policy
behind allowing federal question jurisdiction in the first place. In the myri-
ad of federal question cases that have come before the Court, the policy
justification of uniformity is consistently cited as the touchstone for arising
under jurisdiction. The Court has noted that looking beyond the mechanical
Holmes test becomes necessary because the purpose of federal question
jurisdiction is to allow the federal courts to interpret and unify significant
areas of federal jurisprudence. 7 Accordingly, the substantial federal ques-
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act ("FDCA"). Id at 805-06. Specifically, the complaints alleged
that children were born with deformities as a result of the mother's use of Bendectin during pregnancy.
Id. at 805. Merrell Dow removed the case to federal court on the basis that the action was founded on a
claim arising under the laws of the United States. Id. at 806. The Supreme Court, however, found that
there was no federal question jurisdiction in this case because the FDCA did not include a private right
of action. Id. at 810-12.
52 545 U.S. 308 (2005).
53 Id. at 312 ("The doctrine captures the commonsense notion that a federal court ought to be able
to hear claims recognized under state law that nonetheless turn on substantial questions of federal law,
and thus justify resort to the experience, solicitude, and hope of uniformity that a federal forum offers on
federal issues .... ").54 See id. at 311-12.
55 Id. at 314.
56 Id. at 312-14.
57 See Merrell Dow Pharms. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 810 (1986) (noting that the court
has "consistently emphasized that, in exploring the outer reaches of § 1331, determinations about federal
jurisdiction require sensitive judgments about congressional intent, judicial power, and the federal
system"); see also Martin H. Redish, Reassessing the Allocation of Judicial Business Between State and
Federal Courts: Federal Jurisdiction and "'The Martian Chronicles ", 78 VA. L. REv. 1769, 1786 (1992)
("They exist to unify the federal system, to interpret and enforce federal law, and to prevent interstate
prejudices and allegiances from balkanizing the nation.").
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tion analysis signifies an approach to arising under jurisdiction that is sensi-
tive to the ultimate question at issue.
B. Patent and Copyright Jurisdiction Under § 1338
Comparable to § 1331, § 1338(a) grants federal district courts subject
matter jurisdiction over "any civil action arising under any Act of Congress
relating to . . .copyrights."58 This federal jurisdiction is both original and
exclusive,59 seeking to foster uniformity and consistency in the field of cop-
yright litigation.6' By designating federal courts as the exclusive forum for
well-pleaded copyright cases, Congress purposefully placed "copyright
disputes in the hands of judges with expertise in the area."'" Such action
was intended to discourage forum shopping, ensure equal treatment of simi-
larly situated parties, and promote national policy goals.62
While a facial reading of § 133 8(a) implies that copyright jurisdiction
is purely federal, such a simplistic understanding of the "arising under"
language is illusory and misleading. Despite the statute's plain terminology,
"Congress left a considerable residue of power in the state courts to pass on
copyright questions," including questions that require construction of the
Copyright Act.63 In particular, federal courts concede that their jurisdiction
is not triggered simply by the mere mention of a copyright.64 Rather, the
question is substantially more sophisticated, and focuses on the cause of
action alleged, the remedies sought by the plaintiff, and the substance of the
claim.65 As such, courts that have tackled the interpretation of the phrase
58 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2012) (emphasis added).
59 Goodman v. Lee, 815 F.2d 1030, 1031 (5th Cir. 1987) ("A federal district court has exclusive
original jurisdiction over civil actions which arise under congressional acts relating to copyrights.");
Bear Creek Prods., Inc. v. Saleh, 643 F. Supp. 489, 491 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) ("Section 1338 of the judicial
code provides exclusive federal jurisdiction over claims 'arising under' federal patent and copyright
laws ....").
60 Ratner, Survey, supra note 9, at 969.
61 Id. at 970.
62 Id. at 969-70; see Cohen, supra note 2, at 380.
63 Muse v. Mellin, 212 F. Supp. 315,316 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) (internal quotation marks omitted).
64 See, e.g., Arthur Young & Co. v. City of Richmond, 895 F.2d 967, 969 (4th Cir. 1990) ("The
mere fact that the complaint discloses that the case involves a copyright dispute, however, does not in
itself lead to a conclusion that the case 'arises under' the Federal Copyright Act for the purpose of
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1338(a)."); Royal v. Leading Edge Prods., Inc., 833 F.2d 1, 2 (1st Cir.
1987) ("It is settled beyond peradventure that an action does not 'arise under' the federal copyright laws
merely because it relates to a product that is the subject of a copyright."); Topolos v. Caldewey, 698
F.2d 991, 993 (9th Cir. 1983) ("However, a case does not arise under the federal copyright laws ...
merely because the subject matter of the action involves or affects a copyright.").
65 T.B. Harms Co. v. Eliscu, 339 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1964); see Muse, 212 F. Supp. at 317 ("The
determinative factor appears to be the cause of action alleged in the complaint."); see also Lombardi v.
Suar~s, 923 F. Supp. 51, 53 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (noting that "the formal allegations of the complaint must
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"arising under" in the context of § 1338 are faced with the same type of
delicate and contextual analysis that has come to illustrate arising under
jurisdiction under § 1331. There are no mechanical rules or quick fixes in
this area, and courts that have wrestled with the meaning of arising under
have journeyed down "one of the darkest corridors of the law of federal
courts and federal jurisdiction."66
In exploring the murky waters associated with copyright jurisdiction,
courts have consistently failed to achieve a uniform interpretation of §
1338(a). To date, the Supreme Court has refused to settle this jurisdictional
debate, leaving lower courts to flounder in a sea of confusion.67 Such uncer-
tainty in application inevitably undermines federal uniformity and produces
conflicting rulings, standards, and expectations. Thus, the status of arising
under jurisdiction is far from clear, and federal courts must "walk a fine line
between 'usurping' the power of the state courts and providing redress for
copyright infringement."6
Given the amorphous and unorganized status of copyright's arising
under jurisprudence, this Section seeks to clarify this disjointed field of law.
In particular, it details the current copyright framework that the Second
Circuit formed in the seminal case of TB. Harms Co. v. Eliscu.69 Decided in
1964, TB. Harms has served as the leading authority on copyright jurisdic-
tion; however, it has also fostered dissent among the lower courts regarding
the interpretation of its standard.7" This Section analyzes the three different
tests courts have implemented in the wake of TB. Harms, specifically: (1)
the essence test; (2) the Schoenberg test; and, (3) the well-pleaded com-
plaint test.
1. The Mothership of Copyright Jurisdiction: TB. Harms Co. v.
Eliscu
Lacking guidance from the country's highest court, the Second Circuit
offered a beacon of hope in 1964 with its innovative interpretation of
§ 1338(a). Long perceived as the mothership of copyright jurisdiction, 7
yield to the substance of the claim" (quoting Stepdesign, Inc. v. Research Media, Inc., 442 F. Supp. 32,
33 (S.D.N.Y. 1977)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
66 Marshall v. New Kids on the Block P'ship, 780 F. Supp. 1005, 1008 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (quoting
Arthur Young & Co. v. Richmond, 895 F.2d 967, 969 n.2 (4th Cir. 1990)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
67 Ratner, Survey, supra note 9, at 958.
68 Birrer, Note, supra note 9, at 273.
69 339 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1964).
70 See Joseph J. Legat Architects, P.C. v. U.S. Dev. Corp., 601 F. Supp. 673, 676 (N.D. Ili. 1985)
("TB. Harms is the seminal case for the meaning of 'arising under' in § 1338.").
71 See Scandinavian Satellite Sys., AS v. Prime TV Ltd., 291 F.3d 839, 844 (D.C. Cir. 2002)
(stating that the decision in TB. Harms "has guided the federal courts for many years in determinations
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TB. Harms sought to apply the Supreme Court's then-conservative inter-
pretation of "arising under" to the copyright field.72 While only persuasive
authority for courts outside the Second Circuit, TB. Harms has influenced
and governed almost all copyright jurisdictional debates to date.
The facts of TB. Harms are simple and represent one of the standard
copyright claims presented in courts. Vincent Youmans, a songwriter, com-
posed music pursuant to a contract with RKO Studios, Inc., for use in the
motion picture, "Flying Down to Rio."" Under the 1933 contract, Youmans
"agreed to assign to RKO the recordation and certain other rights relating to
the picture during the existence of the copyrights and any renewals."74 In
return, RKO promised to employ a lyricist and obtain publishing rights for
Youmans, who was to pay the lyricist customary royalties on the music.75
Under this agreement, Youmans could assign the publication and perform-
ing rights to the music.76
Subsequently, RKO employed two lyricists, including Edward Eliscu,
and both lyricists agreed to assign their rights to RKO. Youmans then as-
signed his reserve rights to Max Dreyfus, the principal stockholder of T.B.
Harms Company.77 In what has been deemed the central controversy of this
case, Eliscu allegedly assigned his existing and renewal copyrights to Drey-
fus under an agreement entered into on June 30, 1933.78 When the copy-
rights were set to expire, however, Eliscu assigned his rights in the renewal
copyrights to Ross Jungnickel, Inc., pursuant to an agreement dated Febru-
ary 19, 1962."
Following this assignment of rights, Eliscu learned that he possessed a
one-half interest in the renewal rights and demanded an accounting from
T.B. Harms Company."0 To enforce this request, he initiated an action in the
New York Supreme Court, seeking a declaration that he owned a one-third
interest in the copyrights and forcing T.B. Harms Company to provide an
accounting."' In response, T.B. Harms Company filed suit against Eliscu
of subject matter jurisdiction under § 1338(a)"); Bassett v. Mashantucket Pequot Tribe, 204 F.3d 343,
347 (2d Cir. 2000) (describing TB. Harms as a "landmark decision").
72 See Birrer, Note, supra note 9, at 283 (noting that TB. Harms supports the view that "courts
should narrowly read provisions conferring federal subject matter jurisdiction so as not to deprive state
courts of jurisdiction over matters of minor federal significance"). See generally T.B. Harms Co. v.
Eliscu, 339 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1964).





78 Id. In return for assigning his existing and renewal copyrights to Dreyfus, Eliscu was to receive
certain royalty payments. Id
79 T.B. Harms, 339 F.2d at 824-25.




and Jungnickel approximately seven weeks later in the Southern District of
New York, seeking equitable and declaratory relief.82 Jurisdiction for this
suit was premised on § 1338(a). 3
At the district court level, Judge Weinfeld determined that the funda-
mental controversy was whether or not Eliscu executed the June 30, 1933
agreement with Dreyfus. 4 As such, the mere fact "that the suit incidentally
centers about a copyright does not, in and of itself, support Federal jurisdic-
tion." 5 The resolution of the dispute depended upon the interpretation of
state contract law since there were no facts presented to support a claim for
infringement.8 6 Thus, Judge Weinfeld held that there was no claim arising
under the Copyright Act.87
In affirming the district court's decision, the Second Circuit surveyed
existing standards for arising under jurisdiction and found both the "ingre-
dient theory" and "creation test" inapplicable to the Copyright Act.88 The
ingredient theory, proposed by Chief Justice Marshall in Osborn v. Bank of
the United States,89 held that federal jurisdiction extended to all cases in
which federal law furnished a necessary ingredient of the claim.98 In refut-
ing the application of the ingredient theory to copyright jurisdiction, Judge
Friendly remarked that federal courts do not have jurisdiction over all dis-
putes regarding western land titles (which often originate in patent suits),
even though such conflicts primarily arise in the area of state law.9 There-
fore, the court determined that the "extensive jurisdiction" conferred by the
ingredient theory was at odds with § 1338(a).92
Similarly, Judge Friendly rejected Justice Holmes's creation test. De-
spite praising Justice Holmes's analysis, Judge Friendly found the creation
test wholly inapplicable to the facts of T.B. Harms.93 Particularly, Justice
Holmes's formula was more useful for inclusion than exclusion and "[t]he
relevant statutes create no explicit right of action to enforce or rescind as-
signments of copyrights, nor does any copyright statute specify a cause of
82 Id.; T.B. Harms Co. v. Eliscu, 226 F. Supp. 337, 338 (SD.N.Y.), aff'd, 339 F.2d 823 (2d Cir.
1964).
83 TB. Harms, 339 F.2d at 825.
84 T.B. Harms, 226 F. Supp. at 338.
85 Id.
86 Id. at 339; see Fleischman, Comment, supra note 9, at 123.
87 T.B. Harms, 226 F. Supp. at 339.
88 T.B. Harms, 339 F.2d at 825-27 (internal quotation marks omitted).
89 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
90 Id. at 823 ("We think, then, that when a question to which the judicial power of the Union is
extended by the constitution, forms an ingredient of the original cause, it is in the power of Congress to
give the Circuit Courts jurisdiction of that cause, although other questions of fact or of law may be
involved in it.").
91 TB. Harms, 339 F.2d at 826.
92 id.
93 Id. at 827 ("Harms' claim is not within Holmes' definition.").
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action to fix the locus of ownership." 94 Thus, the Second Circuit held that
the Holmes test could not be applied to § 1338(a).95
Given the downfalls of the ingredient theory and creation test, Judge
Friendly proposed a new, three-prong analysis to determine copyright juris-
diction.96 According to the court:
Mindful of the hazards of formulation in this treacherous area, we think that an action
"arises under" the Copyright Act if and only if the complaint is for a remedy expressly grant-
ed by the Act, e.g., a suit for infringement or for the statutory royalties for record reproduc-
tion, or asserts a claim requiring construction of the Act ... , or, at the very least and perhaps
more doubtfully, presents a case where a distinctive policy of the Act requires that federal
principles control the disposition of the claim.
97
Thus, under TB. Harms, a copyright case invokes federal jurisdiction if: (1)
the remedy sought is provided by the Copyright Act; (2) the case requires
construction of the Copyright Act; or, (3) the case involves distinctive fed-
eral policies.98
2. Confusion in the Wake of TB. Harms: The Copyright Jurisdic-
tion Landscape Today
Although the Second Circuit attempted to offer a simplified frame-
work for arising under jurisdiction, the interpretation of TB. Harms by
lower courts has been all but uniform. Justice Friendly's three-prong ap-
proach to copyright jurisdiction was unintentionally vague and created am-
ple room for judicial interpretation.99 In construing the TB. Harms standard,
lower courts have developed three conflicting approaches to § 1338(a): (1)
the essence test; (2) the Schoenberg test; and (3) the well-pleaded complaint
test.t ° This Subsection details these three standards and clarifies where
copyright jurisdiction stands today.
94 Id.
95 Id. at 826-27.
96 See id. at 828; McCarthy, Comment, supra note 9, at 171.
97 TB. Harms, 339 F.2d at 828 (citations omitted).
98 See McCarthy, Comment, supra note 9, at 185-86.
99 See Fleischman, Comment, supra note 9, at 125 ("Judge Friendly has, with a single paragraph,
left a legacy of confusion that has led to a series of apparently irreconcilable judicial opinions and rules
in the Second Circuit.").
100 Birrer, Note, supra note 9, at 282.
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a. The Essence Test
Courts adhering to the "essence of the claim" standard base their juris-
dictional decisions on the nature or substance of the claim. 0' These courts
maintain that the substance of the dispute, rather than the formal allegations
of the complaint, should be referenced to properly determine subject matter
jurisdiction. °2 In this sense, courts try to determine the plaintiff's true mo-
tive in initiating the lawsuit and discern whether the copyright dispute is the
heart of the matter.0 3 Thus, "[t]his test encourages courts to attempt to read
the plaintiff's mind" in order to weigh the merits of the case."
The essence test-also referred to as the principal and controlling is-
sue test--originated with the Southern District of New York only eight
years after T.B. Harms. In Elan Associates, Ltd. v. Quackenbush Music,
Ltd., '5 the district court found that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to
determine a claim involving, at its core, a contractual dispute over owner-
ship and title to several copyrights.'06 On May 15, 1968, Carly Simon alleg-
edly executed a written contract giving Elan Associates the exclusive right
to obtain copyrights on her musical compositions.0 7 At that same time,
however, Ms. Simon was also a part owner of Quackenbush Music, which
she formed to hold copyrights in all of her songs."08 Believing her agree-
ment with Elan Associates pertained only to one particular song, Ms. Simon
filed suit in the New York State Supreme Court in 1971 to void the agree-
ment with Elan Associates on the basis of fraud.0 9 Approximately one
month later, Elan Associates filed suit in federal district court against Ms.
Simon for copyright infringement. "0
Acknowledging the Second Circuit's ruling in TB. Harms, Judge
Cannella agreed that "federal courts lack jurisdiction to determine questions
of title dependent on general common law or equitable principles which
must be resolved in the appropriate state court."'' . Nonetheless, the district
court interpreted Judge Friendly's three-prong test as requiring the court to
look at the "principal and controlling issue" involved in the action. "' Upon
101 See Topolos v. Caldewey, 698 F.2d 991, 993 (9th Cir. 1983) (describing the essence test as an
inquiry into the "primary and controlling purpose," "principal issue," or "fundamental controversy ...
of the plaintiffs suit") (internal quotation marks omitted).
102 Birrer, Note, supra note 9, at 282-83.
103 Cohen, supra note 2, at 362.
'04 Id. at 374.
105 Elan Assocs., Ltd. v. Quackenbush Music, Ltd., 339 F. Supp. 461 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).




110 Id. at 462.
III Elan, 339 F. Supp. at 462.
112 id.
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a careful reading of the facts alleged in Quackenbush Music's complaint,
Judge Cannella held that Elan Associates' claim for copyright infringement
was really a wolf in sheep's clothing: the heart of the action was a state law
contract dispute currently being litigated in New York state court."3 Thus,
the court declined to exercise jurisdiction by "[l]ooking beyond the wording
of the complaint."" 14
Although the Elan case adequately showcases the application of the
essence test, the current authority governing this principle is Berger v. Si-
mon & Schuster."5 In Berger, the plaintiff signed a publishing agreement
with the defendant in which he promised to deliver a book, The Southamp-
ton Diet."6 The defendant possessed an exclusive license to publish the
book, and secured a copyright in the plaintiffs name.' Following the pub-
lication of The Southampton Diet, the plaintiff published a second book
with a different publisher."8 In light of the second book's success, Simon &
Schuster decided to reprint and sell The Southampton Diet, and notified the
plaintiff of this intent.' The publishing agreement, however, provided the
plaintiff with two methods for revoking Simon & Schuster's right to pub-
lish, and the plaintiff sought to terminate the defendant's rights by filing
suit.'20
In declining jurisdiction, the court noted that the plaintiff framed his
complaint entirely in terms of infringement, but the core of the dispute was
purely contractual.' 2' There was nothing in the claim that required construc-
tion of the Copyright Act.'22 Rather, the complaint "turn[ed] on purely fac-
tual and common law contract issues."'2 3 Thus, the court determined that
Berger's suit was, "at heart," a contract action only and dismissed the case
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.'24
While adherence to the essence test may initially appear contrary to
TB. Harms, courts following this standard have found two main sources of
support for their jurisdictional decisions. First, they cite the TB. Harms
district court opinion, which held that the formal allegations in the com-
plaint must give way to the claim's substance.'25 Second, these courts ex-
113 id.
114 Fleischman, Comment, supra note 9, at 126.
115 631 F. Supp. 915 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); see McCarthy, Comment, supra note 9, at 189.





121 Id. at 917 (claiming that the plaintiff "in substance, albeit not in form, is seeking a declaration
that certain conditions precedent to a revocation of a license have taken place").
122 Berger, 631 F. Supp. at 917.
123 Id.
124 Id. at919.
125 Birrer, Note, supra note 9, at 283.
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pand upon the notion in TB. Harms that the grant of federal jurisdiction
should be narrowly interpreted "so as not to deprive state courts of jurisdic-
tion over matters of minor federal significance.' 26 In this manner, the es-
sence test exhibits one of its strongest advantages: it ensures that the copy-
right claim is central to the outcome of the litigation so that federal courts
are justified in exercising their exclusive jurisdiction.'27
Nonetheless, the essence test has substantial faults that hinder its effec-
tive application in practice. The test blurs the distinction between dismissal
on the merits of the case and dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdic-
tion. "'28 Where a plaintiff sufficiently pleads a claim under the Copyright
Act, but the federal courts determine that the "heart" of the matter is a state
law claim, the parties may interpret this action as a ruling on the substance
of the complaint.'29 Additionally, where a party pleads a copyright claim,
she may find herself stuck in state court if the federal court deems the copy-
right issue incidental to the state law dispute.'30 This determination deprives
plaintiffs of a federal forum in violation of the Copyright Act's specific
conferral of exclusive jurisdiction.
b. The Schoenberg Test
In contrast to the essence approach, the Schoenberg test arose out of a
desire to ensure uniformity, fairness, and predictability among the courts in
jurisdictional interpretation. 3' Proposing a three-prong test that mirrored
the analysis in TB. Harms, the Second Circuit shifted focus from the
"heart" of the plaintiffs complaint to a determination of whether the copy-
right claim was merely "incidental" to the plaintiff's overall dispute. 32 This
interpretation gained traction in the early 1990s' 33 and made clear that
courts could resolve the jurisdictional debate by examining evidence out-
side the pleadings.'34
In Schoenberg, the plaintiff entered into a written publishing agree-
ment with Steimatzky Publishing of North America, Inc., whereby the
126 Id.; see McCarthy, Comment, supra note 9, at 190 ("All of the 'essence' test cases build from
T.B. Harms' policy that state courts should not be deprived of jurisdiction over claims that are of mini-
mal federal significance.").
127 Daniel E. Wanat, Copyright and Contracts: The Subject Matter Jurisdiction of Federal Courts
Under 28 U.S.C. 1338(a), II DEPAUL J. ART & ENT. L. 361, 394 (2001).
128 Birrer, Note, supra note 9, at 285; see Wanat, supra note 127, at 394.
129 See Birrer, Note, supra note 9, at 285.
130 Bassett v. Mashantucket Pequot Tribe, 204 F.3d 343, 348 (2d Cir. 2000).
131 Birrer, Note, supra note 9, at 290-91.
132 See Beam, Comment, supra note 2, at 408-09.
133 See id. at 408.
134 Schoenberg v. Shapolsky Publishers, Inc., 971 F.2d 926, 933 (2d Cir. 1992); Wanat, supra note
127, at 386.
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plaintiff would retain ownership of the copyright and Steimatzky would
receive a license to publish the manuscript.'35 The contract required
Steimatzky and its successor, Shapolsky Publishers, to print the manuscript
within six months of receiving the final draft.136 However, Steimatzky and
Shapolsky allegedly did not publish the manuscript until four years after
receiving the final draft and failed to make any royalty payments to
Schoenberg.'37 In light of these events, Schoenberg brought suit under the
Copyright Act, alleging copyright infringement.'38
Addressing the issue of whether the court had subject matter jurisdic-
tion, Judge Altimari conceded that the issue of copyright jurisdiction "is a
problem that continues to perplex and divide the trial courts of this Cir-
cuit."' 39 Although the court acknowledged its prior decision in TB. Harms,
it determined that this case posed a more difficult jurisdictional question
than what had previously been anticipated in that case.' n Specifically, TB.
Harms did not address the scenario where a plaintiff pleads infringement as
the result of a contractual breach."' Thus, the court found the framework of
T.B. Harms inapplicable to the present case, and instead adopted the para-
digm for arising under jurisdiction set forth in Costello Publishing Co. v.
Rotelle.142
In Costello, the D.C. Circuit answered the jurisdictional question by
determining whether the complaint "alleges a breach of a condition to, or a
covenant of, the contract licensing or assigning the copyright.' 43 Where
there is a breach of a condition, then the federal courts possess subject mat-
ter jurisdiction.'" However, if the complaint pleads only the breach of a
covenant or assignment of the copyright, then the court must decide if the
breach is material enough to create a right of rescission. "' If so, then the
claim arises under the Copyright Act and invokes federal jurisdiction.'46
To implement the Costello analysis within the current T.B. Harms
framework, Judge Altimari thus suggested a three-prong approach to copy-
right jurisdiction:




139 Id. at 931.
140 Id.
141 Schoenberg, 971 F.2d at 931-32.
142 Id. ("We believe the appropriate test under the T.B. Harms paradigm, for determining whether a
suit 'arises under' the Copyright Act when it alleges infringement stemming from a breach of contract,
was enunciated in Costello Publishing Co. v. Rotelle. ); Costello Publ'g Co. v. Rotelle, 670 F.2d
1035 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
143 Schoenberg, 971 F.2d at 932 (citing Costello, 670 F.2d at 1045).
144 Id. (citing Costello, 670 F.2d at 1045).
145 Id. (citing Costello, 670 F.2d at 1045).
146 Id. (citing Costello, 670 F.2d at 1045).
[VOL. 23:3
THE KNOTTIEST PROBLEM
A district court must first ascertain whether the plaintiffs infringement claim is only "inci-
dental" to the plaintiffs claim seeking a determination of ownership or contractual rights un-
der the copyright. If it is determined that the claim is not merely incidental, then a district
court must next determine whether the complaint alleges a breach of a condition to, or a cov-
enant of, the contract licensing or assigning the copyright .... [I]f a breach of a condition is
alleged, then the district court has subject matter jurisdiction. But if the complaint merely al-
leges a breach of a contractual covenant in the agreement that licenses or assigns the copy-
right, then the court must undertake a third step and analyze whether the breach is so material
as to create a right of rescission in the grantor. If the breach would create a right of rescis-
sion, then the asserted claim arises under the Copyright Act. 1
47
When implementing this three-part test, the court acknowledged the simi-
larity of the last two prongs to the essence test and suggested that the three
prongs would, in practice, merge into one inquiry.' 4t Regardless of the
number of prongs, however, the court made clear that this test permitted the
judiciary to examine evidence outside the pleadings, including affidavits. 49
Despite the Second Circuit's attempt to clarify the TB. Harms stand-
ard, the Schoenberg test provides the judiciary with too much discretion in
determining whether a copyright claim is incidental to a state law claim.5
Comparable to the essence test, when a court finds that the copyright claim
is incidental to the state law cause of action, litigants can interpret this rul-
ing as a judgment on the merits.'5 ' Courts are forced "to make substantive
determinations in the absence of a true understanding of the case, which is
revealed only after a trial."'52 These findings may require the court to con-
duct extensive hearings at an early stage in the case.'53 Furthermore, this
framework prevents the plaintiff from knowing with certainty where to file
suit. "'54 Because the courts are permitted to examine evidence outside the
pleadings, jurisdiction may turn on the defendant's answer or a third party's
affidavit. In this manner, jurisdiction is controlled by the defendant, not the
plaintiff.'55 Thus, not only does the Schoenberg test suffer from the same
147 Id. at 932-33 (citations omitted).
148 Id. at 933.
149 Schoenberg, 971 F.2d at 933. The Northern District of Illinois followed the Schoenberg test in
1997 when it determined whether a copyright claim was incidental to a contract claim. Athanasius-
Design v. Cumberland Homes, Ltd., No. 96-C-6764, 1997 WL 176448, at *3, *5 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 4,
1997).
150 Birrer, Note, supra note 9, at 293.
151 Beam, Comment, supra note 2, at 408-09.
152 Id. at 409; see Bassett v. Mashantucket Pequot Tribe, 204 F.3d 343, 354 (2d Cir. 2000) ("[Tjhe
Schoenberg test requires the court to make complex factual determinations relating to the merits at the
outset of the litigation-before the court has any familiarity with the case.").
153 Wanat, supra note 127, at 389.
154 Bassett, 204 F.3d at 353; Beam, Comment, supra note 2, at 409.
155 Wanat, supra note 127, at 388.
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pitfalls as the essence test, but it also offers no guidance on the definition of
the term "incidental.' 56
c. The Well-Pleaded Complaint Test
Following the failures of the essence approach and Schoenberg test,
federal courts reinstated Judge Friendly's three-part analysis of copyright
jurisdiction and implemented the well-pleaded complaint rule, which forms
the foundation of § 1331 jurisdiction.'57 By adopting this rule, the court
ensured that the plaintiff is the "master" of his claim and can avoid federal
jurisdiction by exclusively relying on state law.'58 Thus, the plaintiffs com-
plaint is dispositive on the question of federal jurisdiction and cannot be
overcome even by an anticipated defense."'
The only significant exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule is
where the plaintiff actively conceals the federal nature of a claim in order to
avoid federal jurisdiction. 6 Where a claim is actually based on federal law,
the plaintiff will not be permitted to artfully plead a state cause of action.'6
In that scenario, the defendant may remove the case to federal court over
the plaintiffs objection."62 As a corollary to this rule, the plaintiff cannot
invoke federal jurisdiction by simply naming a federal statute in the com-
plaint. The relief sought by the plaintiff must be actually based on federal
law, not state law, in order to enter the federal courtroom.'63
156 See Bassett, 204 F.3d at 353; Beam, Comment, supra note 2, at 409 (noting that the Schoenberg
test is vague); see also Wanat, supra note 127, at 387-88 (discussing vague nature of the Schoenberg
test). The Northern District of Illinois stated that
[a copyright] infringement claim is incidental if: (1) disposing of the contract claim automat-
ically disposes of the copyright claim; (2) the plaintiff made no pre-filing attempt to enforce
its copyright either through contract termination or "cease and desist" notices; or (3) resolv-
ing the claim does not require construction of the Copyright Act or application of federal
principles.
Athanasius-Design v. Cumberland Homes, Ltd., No. 96-C-6764, 1997 WL 176448, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Apr.
4, 1997).
157 See supra Section 1.A; see also Birrer, Note, supra note 9, at 286. Birrer notes that courts focus
on two sections of the T.B. Harms decision for support when using the well-pleaded complaint standard:
"First, under T.B. Harms, federal subject matter jurisdiction exists wherever 'the complaint is for a
remedy expressly granted by the Act.' Second, according to the Second Circuit, federal subject matter
jurisdiction exists when the plaintiff directs his complaint against an infringing use and refers to the
license only incidentally." Id. (footnote omitted) (quoting McCarthy, Comment, supra note 9, at 175).
158 Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987).
159 Dead Kennedys v. Biafra, 37 F. Supp. 2d 1151, 1153 (N.D. Cal. 1999).






Today, this well-pleaded complaint rule is perceived as the dominant
jurisdictional analysis in copyright disputes."64 While the Supreme Court
has never addressed this rule in the context of copyright actions, the rule
garners support and justification from its application to patent cases.'65 As
early as 1850, the Supreme Court denied federal jurisdiction where
"[n]either the plaintiffs action nor the remedy sought . . . depended upon
the parties' patent rights.'"66 Because the rights of the parties based on the
face of the complaint depended solely on common law and equity princi-
ples of contract, federal construction of any law relating to patents was un-
necessary.'67 Therefore, federal jurisdiction could not be invoked.66
Similarly, in Christianson v. Colt Industries Operating Corp.,9 the
Supreme Court reaffirmed the applicability of the well-pleaded complaint
rule in the context of patents.' 0 Colt Industries, a seller and marketer of
M16 rifles, acquired sixteen patents to develop the precursor to the M16.'
The patents obtained by Colt concealed the manufacturing specifications of
the rifle to prevent competitors from engaging in mass production.' Those
companies and employees licensed to manufacture M16 parts were required
to sign a nondisclosure agreement.'73 Christianson, a former Colt employee,
established International Trade Services, Inc. ("ITS") and began selling
M16 parts domestically and internationally in violation of the nondisclosure
agreement. '4 Although Colt expressly waived some of its proprietary rights
as to Christianson's early transactions, the corporation notified Christian-
son's current and potential customers that ITS was misappropriating trade
secrets.'75 In response, Christianson filed suit challenging the validity of
Colt's patents and alleging a state law claim for tortious interference with
business relationships.
76
164 See Ratner, Survey, supra note 9, at 965.
165 Id. at 965-66.
166 Wanat, supra note 127, at 367; see Wilson v. Sandford, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 99, 101-02 (1850).
167 Wilson, 51 U.S. at 102.
168 See Cohen, supra note 2, at 352 ("Wilson stands for the principle that not every case that con-
cerns a patent-or by analogy, a copyright-is within thejurisdiction of the federal courts.").
169 486 U.S. 800 (1988).





175 Christianson, 486 U.S. at 804.
176 Id. at 806 ("Petitioners' motion for summary judgment raised only a patent-law issue obliquely
hinted at... that Colt's patents were invalid from their inception for failure to disclose sufficient infor-
mation to 'enable any person skilled in the art . . . to make and use the same' as well as a description of
'the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.' Since Colt benefited from
the protection of the invalid patents, the argument continues, the 'trade secrets' that the patents should
have disclosed lost any state-law protection." (citation omitted) (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (1982))).
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The district court awarded Christianson summary judgment and inval-
idated nine of Colt's patents.177 Colt appealed to the Federal Circuit, which
concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear the appeal. 7 '
After the Federal Circuit denied jurisdiction, it transferred the appeal to the
Seventh Circuit. In turn, the Seventh Circuit raised the jurisdictional ques-
tion sua sponte and transferred the case back to the Federal Circuit.'79 In the
interest of justice, the Federal Circuit decided the case on its merits and
reversed the district court. 80
In vacating the judgment of the Federal Circuit, the Supreme Court de-
termined that the case did not arise under patent laws and, therefore, the
Federal Circuit lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal.' Basing its decision
on linguistic consistency with § 133 1, the Court held that "whether a claim
arises under patent law must be determined from what necessarily appears
in the plaintiff's statement of his own claim in the bill or declaration, unaid-
ed by anything alleged in anticipation or avoidance of defenses which it is
thought the defendant may interpose."'82 In this manner, Justice Brennan
observed that federal jurisdiction could not be invoked by merely anticipat-
ing a patent law defense in the complaint. 83 Instead, patent law must be a
necessary element of the claim or create the cause of action in order to j usti-
fy opening the federal doors.'84 Thus, the viability of the well-pleaded com-
plaint rule for patent actions was solidified in Christianson.
Given the jurisdictional treatment of patents, scholars have vigorously
argued-and courts have agreed-that copyright jurisdiction should simi-
larly depend on the well-pleaded complaint doctrine. 85 This majority ap-
proach today has the advantages of clarity and predictability: as master of
the complaint, a plaintiff will always know where to file suit at the outset of




180 Id. at 807.
181 Christianson, 486 U.S. at 818-19.
182 Id. at 809 (quoting Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Tr., 463 U.S. 1, 10 (1983))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
183 Id. at 809; see also The Fair v. Kohler Die & Specialty Co., 228 U.S. 22, 25 (1913) (explaining
that the question of federal jurisdiction "cannot depend upon the answer, and accordingly jurisdiction
cannot be conferred by the defense even when anticipated and replied to in the bill").
184 Christianson, 486 U.S. at 815.
185 See Ratner, Survey, supra note 9, at 965 ("[The well-pleaded complaint] rule should also apply
to copyright because patent and copyright are treated similarly under § 1338(a)."); see also Foxrun
Workshop, Ltd. v. Klone Mfg., Inc., 686 F. Supp. 86, 87 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) ("Analogous principles apply
to copyrights, patents, and trademarks.").
186 Cohen, supra note 2, at 372-73; see Foxrun Workshop, Ltd., 686 F. Supp. at 90 ("It is important
to the parties to know from the outset whether the court has subject matter jurisdiction over the case.").
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and ensures pleading propriety.'87 Additionally, by resolving the junisdic-
tional dispute at the outset, the court can focus on the merits of the claim
instead of the procedural posture. Therefore, this test ensures that the plain-
tiff will always have a forum available in which to litigate the dispute"'8-a
forum that is typically more sympathetic to the plaintiffs viewpoint.
The advantages of the well-pleaded complaint rule, however, "pale in
comparison to the potential costs of this approach."'8 9 This doctrine pro-
motes form over substance, and traps the defendant in a forum based on
crafty pleading, not the nature of the claim.'" There exists a substantial risk
that the plaintiff will characterize a valid copyright claim as a state law
cause of action in order to actively deny the defendant access to a federal
forum.'9' In this manner, state courts will be tasked with interpreting the
Copyright Act, and the goal of uniformity in copyright interpretation will be
circumvented.'92 In sum, the well-pleaded complaint rule prevents important
federal issues from being heard and adjudicated in federal courts."'
Moreover, this doctrine "does not measure the interest of the parties in
federal adjudication" and further fails to "consider any possible interest of
the federal government in having its laws interpreted and applied by its own
tribunals."' 94 The well-pleaded complaint rule ignores strong policy ration-
ales that favor federal forums and can even clog federal courts with basic
state causes of action. 9 For instance, when facts determined at an early
stage of the litigation reveal that there is no federal claim or issue to be de-
cided, dismissal on jurisdictional grounds at that time is inappropriate.'
Thus, the federal court must hear the entire dispute even if the claim is sole-
ly premised on state law. The well-pleaded complaint rule is therefore
equally as flawed as the essence and Schoenberg tests despite the fact that it
is "deeply entrenched in federal jurisdictional jurisprudence."'97
187 Donald L. Doemberg, There's No Reason For It; It's Just Our Policy: Why The Well-Pleaded
Complain! Rule Sabotages the Purposes of Federal Question Jurisdiction, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 597, 651
(1987).
188 Wanat, supra note 127, at 394.
189 Cohen, supra note 2, at 373.
190 See Ratner, Survey, supra note 9, at 972.
191 Id. at 972 (acknowledging that "[t]his is a genuinely unfortunate possibility").
192 See generally id. at 969-75 (discussing the purpose of exclusive federal jurisdiction over copy-
right right actions and highlighting the shortcomings of the well-pleaded complaint rule in achieving
these goals).
193 Doemberg, supra note 187, at 651.
194 Id. at 650.
195 Cohen, supra note 2, at 373 ("By requiring courts to defer to the plaintiff's pleading choices,
the well-pleaded complaint approach .. .might open the floodgates to allow more and more federal
litigation of cases that are at heart contract disputes.").
196 Wanat, supra note 127, at 394.
197 McCarthy, Comment, supra note 9, at 190 n.229, 192.
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II. PRACTICAL PROBLEMS
The well-pleaded complaint rule's application in the context of § 1338
remains questionable in theory. But the unfortunate reality is that the use of
the well-pleaded complaint rule is even more flawed in practice. Copyright
jurisdiction remains an area of uniquely federal significance-the passage
of § 1338 alone conveys legislative interest in seeking interpretation and
uniformity in this relatively complex area through exclusive relegation to
the federal forum. That is not to say, however, that a clever plaintiff is out
of luck if he wishes to remain in state court.
It has long been the prerogative of plaintiffs to choose among the
claims they wish to pursue. Accordingly, if the plaintiff is master of his
complaint, he has the option to eschew federal claims and plead state law
claims only in order to prevent removal of his action to the federal courts.
But this raises two questions. First, if there are copyright issues afoot in a
lawsuit, why would a plaintiff attempt to state claims that would prevent
removal of an action to the federal court? Further, if there are good reasons
for avoiding the federal forum, how can a plaintiff utilize the well-pleaded
complaint rule to defeat federal jurisdiction? The following sections explore
such questions.
A. Reasons to Avoid the Federal Forum
Copyright law is a notoriously complex and difficult comer of the law.
To apply doctrines in this area requires careful study and willingness to
delve into complicated issues. So, if copyright issues are so intricate, why
would a plaintiff seek to have his case heard in state court?
Preference for the state forum has long been explained in a variety of
myths, at least some of which might be persuasive in the copyright context.
The first myth is, of course, that plaintiffs may wish to litigate in state court
where they perceive decisionmakers or juries to be more sympathetic to
their cause, or more biased in their favor. The reasons for this feeling are
manifold. First, the status of the parties plays into this issue. If the plaintiff
is an individual and the defendant is a corporation, the plaintiff may desire
to stay in state court to avoid more business-friendly or defendant-friendly
federal courts. The question of whether federal courts are truly more de-
fendant friendly is an oft-debated one, 9 ' but at least some empirical data
indicates that a plaintiff's case does not have the same chance of success in
198 E.g., Heather R. Barber, Comment, Developments in the Law: Federal Jurisdiction and Forum
Selection: V. Removal and Remand, 37 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1555, 1555 (2004) ("The presumption is that
federal courts are more defendant-friendly." (emphasis added)).
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the federal forum.99 This seems to be especially true when the defendant is
a large, out-of-state corporation.2 °
This bias is recognized by the bar. In one study, 70 percent of attor-
neys in a sample of state court proceedings and 63 percent of attorneys in a
sample of federal court proceedings noted that an individual's resident sta-
tus was important in the preference to file in state court.21' This may be be-
cause, as at least some research suggests, local juries are more prone to
engage in wealth redistribution by taking money from out-of-state corpora-
tions and awarding it to local plaintiffs. 22 A local plaintiff may thus wish to
take advantage of a local judge and jury, who may be more familiar with
the plaintiffs status or situation or more sympathetic to community inter-
ests. Of course, federal judges and juries are members of their local com-
munities, but the juries are drawn from the entire federal district and may
come from a different economic, social, or regional background. A plaintiff
might wish to have a jury of his actual peers drawn from the local commu-
nity and therefore try to defeat removal of his copyright action to ensure a
sympathetic venire.
Furthermore, a copyright plaintiff may be especially keen on avoiding
federal court in order to prey on the perceived biases and inequities present
in the federal-state balance. This is especially the case if the plaintiff wishes
to portray himself, the artist, as wronged by a major corporation who has
hijacked his work in some way. Additionally, and perhaps most controver-
sially, plaintiffs may wish to actually avoid the expertise of federal courts in
copyright actions. The purpose of § 1338 is to seek uniformity in the com-
plicated area of copyright law by utilizing the federal courts. Pursuant to
this congressional mandate, federal courts now ostensibly have expertise in
the area of copyright far above what might be expected in a state court.
While this expertise usually benefits litigants,2°3 a plaintiff with a close
question might actually desire a more lax understanding of the copyright
rules. Indeed, a plaintiff may hope that a state court would incorrectly apply
copyright doctrines, or be tempted to see such actions as solely breach of
contract cases while ignoring difficult copyright questions.
Of course, there may be other strategic reasons for avoiding the federal
forum, including simple matters of convenience or expediency. A plaintiff
199 Id. at 1555 (noting statistics demonstrating that "defendants who successfully remove to federal
court enjoy higher win rates").
200 Victor E. Flango, Attorneys' Perspectives on Choice of Forum in Diversity Cases, 25 AKRON L.
REv. 41,64 (1991).
201 Jd. at 63.
202 See TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 491 (1993) (O'Connor, J., dissent-
ing) ("Finally, juries may feel privileged to correct perceived social ills stemming from unequal wealth
distribution by transferring money from 'wealthy' corporations to comparatively needier plaintiffs.");
Lester Brickman, The Asbestos Litigation Crisis: Is There a Need for an Administrative Alternative?, 13
CARDOZO L. REv. 1819, 1849 n. 128 (1992).
203 Ratner, Survey, supra note 9, at 970.
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may seek a faster resolution of his case and believe that is likely to occur in
state court. Similarly, a plaintiff may not want to travel to the nearest feder-
al division in order to appear, or may wish to take advantage of some state
procedural mechanism that would not be available in federal court. But
regardless, it seems at least somewhat clear that some plaintiffs may seek to
avoid federal forums even when copyright is implicated in the lawsuit.
B. Avoiding the Federal Forum
Assuming that the reasons illuminated above might convince a plain-
tiff to avoid federal court, the next question is as follows: how might one do
that? This Article does not seek to be a manual for plaintiffs attempting to
remain in state court, but the reality is that a clever plaintiff can easily avoid
federal question jurisdiction, even when copyright issues are implicated.
The issues discussed here are likely to arise in two contexts. First, the
plaintiff has filed her action in state court and is now facing a motion to
dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Such a motion would be
premised on the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts over copyright
actions under § 1338. A state court judge would thus have to decide if the
state court was divested of jurisdiction based on the presence of jurisdiction
arising under issues of copyright. The alternative is that the defendant does
not seek to dismiss the state court proceeding, but instead removes the case
to federal court. The plaintiff would then be seeking a motion to remand the
case back to her preferred forum. This Article focuses on the latter scenar-
io-first, because it is the most likely, and second, because it is easier to
discern how federal courts would approach this question of arising under
jurisdiction in the context of copyright.
If removal is premised on federal question jurisdiction, a federal court
is likely to employ the well-pleaded complaint rule and assess whether an
essential element of the claim, on the face of the plaintiff's complaint, rais-
es a federal question. Of course, the mere presence of the word "copyright"
in the complaint or the fact that copyrighted material is at issue is not talis-
manic.2" However, federal jurisdiction will exist, without much doubt, in
some contexts. First, the open-and-shut case for federal jurisdiction comes
in the form of copyright infringement actions. A copyright infringement
action arises under federal law because federal law actually creates the
cause of action. Indeed, T.B. Harms noted that "an action 'arises under' the
Copyright Act if and only if the complaint is for a remedy expressly granted
by the Act, e.g., a suit for infringement.""2 5 This squarely comports with
general principles of federal question jurisdiction. It has been historically
204 See Arthur Young & Co. v. City of Richmond, 895 F.2d 967, 969 (4th Cir. 1990); Topolos v.
Caldewey, 698 F.2d 991, 993 (9th Cir. 1983); Muse v. Mellin, 212 F. Supp. 315, 316 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
205 T.B. Harms Co. v. Eliscu, 339 F.2d 823, 828 (2d Cir. 1964).
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certain that causes of action created by federal law are appropriately heard
in the federal forum.
20 6
Copyright issues, however, can give rise to federal question jurisdic-
tion even outside the parameters of the creation test. For example, where
coownership of a copyright by nature of coauthorship is implicitly at issue,
arising under jurisdiction will be satisfied. The idea governing this result is
that if the plaintiff is seeking a remedy, the plaintiff must establish the right
that gives rise to that remedy under the Copyright Act. If establishing that
right involves a determination of coownership, then arising under jurisdic-
tion is likely to exist. Indeed, each federal court of appeals that has ad-
dressed the issue has concluded that a determination of copyright ownership
based on a disputed allegation of coauthorship presents a federal question
that arises under, and must be determined according to, the Copyright
Act.
207
For example, in Merchant v. Levy, 2°8 the Second Circuit assessed the
presence of arising under jurisdiction in an action initiated by alleged coau-
thors of a copyright.2 9 The plaintiffs were two of the original members of
the singing group "The Teenagers" and alleged that in 1955 they jointly
wrote the initial version of the song "Fools," but that another individual,
Frank Lymon, made a number of changes to the song when he subsequently
joined the group.2 " Later, George Goldner, the owner of Gee Records, filed
a copyright for "Fools," listing himself and Lymon as sole coauthors. 21
Over a decade later, the defendant, Morris Levy, purchased Goldner's in-
terest in several music companies, including the music publishing company
that held the copyright for "Fools. '1 Goldner subsequently wrote a letter to
the Copyright Office stating that Levy, not Goldner, had coauthored
"Fools" with Lymon, and the copyright registration was amended to reflect
this statement.2 3 The plaintiffs never received any royalties from "Fools"
and were allegedly threatened with physical force and death by Levy when
they inquired about royalty payments."1 4
While believing they were entitled to royalties from "Fools," the plain-
r'' . .1. - -.... 
1  i mch 1: .. . 2 -A t th time of litigation,L1113 UIU ,okr P, -bUU ,1lt, on until ,much lat ,.' A  ile LIIIIM U1 1L ~ ~l
they asserted that they were coowners of the copyright because of their sta-
206 id.
207 See, e.g., Cambridge Literary Props., Ltd. v. W. Goebel Porzellanfabrik G.m.b.H. & Co., 510
F.3d 77, 84-85 (1st Cir. 2007); Gaiman v. McFarlane, 360 F.3d 644, 652-53 (7th Cir. 2004); Merchant
v. Levy, 92 F.3d 51, 55 (2d Cir. 1996).
208 92 F.3d 51 (2d Cir. 1996).
209 Id. at 55.
210 Id. at 52.
211 Id.
212 Id. at 53.
213 Id.
214 Merchant, 92 F.3d at 53.
215 id.
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tus as coauthors of a joint work, and they sought declaratory relief and
damages to this effect." 6 The plaintiffs persevered in the district court, but,
on appeal, the defendants challenged the subject matter jurisdiction of the
federal courts on the grounds that the plaintiffs' claim for a declaration of
coownership was not a federal cause of action.2t 7 Quoting T.B. Harms, the
court noted that federal question jurisdiction would exist
"if the complaint is for a remedy expressly granted by the [Copyright] Act,... or asserts a
claim requiring construction of the Act... or, at the very least and perhaps more doubtfully,
presents a case where a distinctive policy of the Act requires that federal principles control
the disposition of the claim."
2 18
The court further asserted that a case in which the plaintiffs were seeking to
establish coownership by coauthorship fell "well within these jurisdictional
bounds.219
In particular, the Second Circuit noted that where a dispute of copy-
right ownership arises under an agreement between the parties (i.e., a con-
tract), resolution of the ultimate question depends entirely on state law.22
However, a determination of coownership by coauthorship arises directly
from the terms of the Copyright Act itself.22 Even though the Copyright
Act does not define the terms "joint author" or "joint work," the factual
analysis of whether the plaintiffs participated in composing the song was
necessary to determine if 17 U.S.C. § 201(a)22 was satisfied; namely,
whether they were "authors of a joint work" and, thus, "co[-]owners of
copyright in the work.
223
The reasoning of Merchant has been adopted, mirrored, or mimicked
in a number of other courts.224 For example, in Royal v. Leading Edge
Products, Inc.,225 the First Circuit similarly tackled whether federal subject
matter jurisdiction was appropriate in a suit by a plaintiff seeking declarato-
ry relief stating that he was the coowner of a copyright.226 In Royal, the de-
216 id.
217 Id. at 55.
218 Id. (alterations in original) (quoting T.B. Harms Co. v. Eliscu, 339 F.2d 823, 828 (2d Cir.
1964)).
219 Id.
220 Merchant, 92 F.3d at 55.
221 Id.; see Goodman v. Lee, 815 F.2d 1030, 1031-32 (5th Cir. 1987); see also Lieberman v. Estate
of Chayefsky, 535 F. Supp. 90, 91 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 1, § 12.01 [A], at
12-13.
222 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (2012).
223 See Merchant, 92 F.3d at 55-56 (alteration in original) (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 201(a)).
224 See e.g., Santa-Rosa v. Combo Records, 471 F.3d 224, 227, 228 (1st Cir. 2006); Gaiman v.
McFarlane, 360 F.3d 644, 652 (7th Cir. 2004); see also Goodman v. Lee (Goodman 11), 78 F.3d 1007,
1010 (5th Cir. 1996).
225 833 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1987).
226 Id. at 1-2.
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fendant hired the plaintiff as a word processing development manager.227
Later, the plaintiff and a coworker agreed to develop a software package in
exchange for stipulated royalty payments based on future sales of the pack-
age.22 s The software package was completed, and it was an original work
that contained copyrightable subject matter.229 Later, the plaintiffs em-
ployment was terminated, and the defendant stopped paying royalties.23 °
The relevant language from the parties' agreement stated that further royal-
ties would not be paid if the plaintiff was fired for cause, but that plaintiff
would be entitled to five years of royalty payments if he was discharged
"for no cause. 23'
The plaintiff brought suit, alleging that he was terminated without
cause.232 He sought a declaratory judgment that he was a coowner of the
copyright and an accounting for profits derived since the date of his termi-
nation.233 He also sought damages for breach of the royalty agreement.234
The parties asserted that federal jurisdiction was appropriate because the
complaint stated claims requiring the construction of the Copyright Act, as
it implicated the work-for-hire doctrine.235 Specifically, the plaintiff argued
that, although the copyright initially inured to his employer because the
work was produced as part of plaintiffs employment, the defendant's sub-
sequent breach of the royalty agreement allowed the plaintiff to rescind the
agreement and therefore retake his ownership interest in the copyright. 236
This, according to plaintiff, was enough to satisfy federal question jurisdic-
tion.237
Adopting the TB. Harms test, the First Circuit disagreed with the
plaintiffs jurisdictional theory.238 The court noted that there were ultimately
only two theories of liability:
[l]f the royalty agreement stands, then the plaintiff's sole remedy for the breach of it would
be money damages-and the Copyright Act need not be construed. If, however, as plaintiff
suggests, the royalty agreement is subject to rescission because of defendant's material
breach thereof, then that agreement would vanish. We would be left with no "written instru-
227 Id. at 1.
228 id.
229 id. at 2.
230 id. at 1-2.





236 Id. at 3.
237 Royal, 833 F.2d at 2.
238 Id
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ment" signed by the parties, and the employer would be "considered the author" in the ab-
sence of such an instrument.
239
Based on the above reasoning, there would be no way for the plaintiff
to claim ownership rights based on the Copyright Act-the jurisdictional
question was a "classic no-win situation."'24 Further, the court noted that it
would "decide whether a case arises under the copyright laws by focusing
on the nature of the principal claim asserted by the plaintiff. ' 24 ' The first
step in resolving the controversy would have to be determining whether the
defendant complied with the terms of the royalty agreement and what the
effect of any noncompliance would be on the contract.242 In spirit, this was a
breach of contract claim and did not implicate the Copyright Act in any
jurisdictionally meaningful way.243
Apparently, one could take some simple lessons from the above cases
in order to avoid the federal forum: (1) do not allege copyright infringe-
ment; (2) do not seek a declaration of coownership by nature of
coauthorship; but (3) do allege a breach of contract claim. Equally as im-
portant is a plaintiff's ability to categorize the actual copyright issues in his
case as incidental to his garden-variety breach of contract claim. Remnants
of the Schoenburg test control this result. Specifically, Schoenburg had long
encouraged courts to consider whether a plaintiffs "infringement claim is
only 'incidental' to the plaintiff's claim seeking a determination of owner-
ship or contractual rights under the copyright." 2" This suggests that, in ju-
risdictions following or inspired by the Schoenburg formulation, courts
should look beyond the complaint and determine if the plaintiff was con-
cerned with copyright infringement or was more interested in pursuing con-
tractual remedies. This proposition is based on the notion that "[tihe juris-
diction of the federal district courts cannot be manipulated by the simple
expedient of creative labelling." '245
For example, in Malinowski v. Playboy Enterprises, Inc.,246 a freelance
photographer brought suit against Playboy magazine, alleging that he was
the copyright holder of two different sets of photographs that were pub-
lished by Playboy in violation of his copyright.247 Because the plaintiff had
taken the photographs for Playboy as a freelance photographer, Playboy
argued that the plaintiff could not be the copyright holder because the pho-
239 Id. at 3 (citation omitted) (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1982)).
240 Id.
241 Id. at 4 (quoting Topolos v. Caldewey, 698 F.2d 991, 993 (9th Cir. 1983)).
242 Id.
243 Royal, 833 F.2d at 4.
244 Schoenberg v. Shapolsky Publishers, Inc., 971 F.2d 926, 932 (2d Cir. 1992).
245 Ferris v. General Dynamics Corp., 645 F. Supp. 1354, 1358 (D.R.I. 1986).




tographs were "work[s] made for hire." '248 When the court searched the
complaint, it found that plaintiff's only real allegation was that he had not
been paid for the work he performed for Playboy.249 Accordingly, although
he asserted a claim for copyright infringement, the majority of his com-
plaint and arguments boiled down to the fact that he had not been paid.25°
Thus, the court found that the action was "essentially a garden-
variety contract dispute, notwthstanding [sic] [plaintiffs] heroic efforts to
costume it in the guise of a copyright action."25 ' Although the plaintiff had
desired to remain in federal court, his failure is a good lesson for those try-
ing to stay in state court-even if copyright issues abound in the lawsuit, it
is helpful to characterize the ultimate remedy as one based in contract.
Malinowski suggests that courts will search the complaint to determine
what is truly at issue in the litigation-is it copyright, or is it contract? But
for plaintiffs with a closer call, avoiding the federal forum is still possible.
This is primarily due to the Supreme Court's decision in Christianson v.
Colt Industries. Christianson's reaffirmation of the well-pleaded complaint
rule in the § 1338 context might seem detrimental to those wishing to stay
in the safety of state court-but Christianson's lesson is broader than that.
Specifically, Christianson articulates that jurisdiction does not necessarily
exist simply because a plaintiff "alleges a single theory [of a claim] under
which resolution" of a federal question is essential.252 The Christianson
Court thus suggested that the well-pleaded complaint might reveal reasons
unrelated to federal law why a plaintiff may be entitled to the relief he is
seeking. Accordingly, this "alternative theor[y]" provision allows plaintiffs
to avoid arising under jurisdiction by referencing at least one legal theory in
this complaint that does not require the resolution of a federal issue.53
Of course, Christianson itself was decided in the patent context,254 but
its lesson is no less potent in the arena of copyright. In Christianson, the
plaintiff pled a violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act by alleging that
the defendant had made false assertions that the plaintiff was violating its
trade secrets, when in reality those trade secrets were not protected because
the underlying patents were invalid. 5 According to plaintiffs, these false
statements were made in an attempt to willfully acquire monopoly power in
the industry, and a determination of whether the patents were invalid was
the only basis for the monopolization theory presented.256
248 Id. at 614.
249 Id. at 615.
250 Id. at 616.
251 Id. (quoting Royal v. Leading Edge Products, Inc., 833 F.2d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1987)).
252 Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 810 (1988).
253 id.
254 id.
255 Id. at 805.
256 Id. at 809.
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When the Court addressed the presence of federal question jurisdiction
on these facts, it determined that the theory presented by the plaintiff was
only one of several which could have been used to support its allegations of
monopolization. 7 Specifically, the Court identified several other theories
to support monopolization. 2 ' First, the plaintiff could have established that
the defendant's allegation of trade secret infringement was false because the
defendant had authorized the plaintiff to use the trade secrets, not because
the patents were invalid; indeed, there was language in the complaint sug-
gesting that the defendant had previously granted the plaintiff permission to
sell certain parts covered by the patents.259 This would establish behavior
consistent with monopolization without needing to decide the validity of the
patents.2 6 Similarly, additional allegations of the defendant's bad behavior,
including circulating inapplicable court orders and suggestions that such
orders prevented the recipient from doing business with the plaintiff, would
have promoted the theory of monopolization without having to resolve the
patent questions.26'
Thus, the lesson from Christianson seems clear-"[i]l,] on the face of
a well-pleaded complaint there are ... reasons completely unrelated to the
provisions and purposes" of federal law why a plaintiff may be entitled to
relief, arising under jurisdiction simply does not exist.262 Instead, a plain-
tiff's claim arises under federal law only when every theory supporting the
claim requires the resolution of a federal issue.263
An example will help illustrate the problem with this approach in the
copyright setting. Under Christianson, a court will analyze the complaint to
determine whether there is an alternative legal theory for a claim that impli-
cates copyright issues that rests solely on state law."6 Therefore, a plaintiff
can easily avoid federal jurisdiction by asserting an alternate legal theory
that does not require interpretation or analysis of the Copyright Act. For
example, assume that a three-member band or musical group enters into a
partnership agreement that specifies they will split all proceeds from songs,
regardless of contribution. If one member later brings an action for an ac-
counting of profits from a particular song, the defendant may assert that
coownership by coauthorship is the only thing truly at issue-and federal
question jurisdiction is appropriate. But reaching that conclusion ignores
257 Id. at 811.




262 Id. at 810 (quoting Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Tr., 463 U.S. 1, 26 (1983)).
263 This focus seems particularly appropriate in light of the post-Twombly approach to pleading in
general. Since the adoption of the plausible pleading standard in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544 (2007), the Supreme Court has noted that, when reviewing a complaint, a court should assess
the claims presented, not the theories at issue. See Johnson v. City of Shelby, 134 S. Ct. 346 (2014).
264 Christianson, 486 U.S. at 810.
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the holding of Christianson. Plaintiffs are entitled to an accounting regard-
less of any application of the Copyright Act; indeed, they are entitled to an
accounting based on their underlying agreement.265 Thus, federal copyright
jurisdiction is still thwarted by the well-pleaded complaint rule.
III. A TwO-STEP APPROACH TO SOLVING COPYRIGHT JURISDICTION
Remedying the pitfalls of the well-pleaded complaint rule is essential,
given that the current standard fails to ensure uniformity due to its suscepti-
bility to artful pleading and its reliance solely on the plaintiffs allegations.
By being able to thwart or invoke federal jurisdiction on a whim, plaintiffs
nationwide undermine and circumvent Congress's decree that federal courts
are the proper forum for copyright disputes. Thus, the well-pleaded com-
plaint rule enables plaintiffs to manipulate jurisdiction in spite of the con-
gressional policy objectives supporting § 1338(a).
Also concerning is the well-pleaded complaint rule's failure to adapt
to the Supreme Court's liberalization of federal question jurisdiction, as
seen in the context of § 1331. The Court's movement away from rigid ap-
plications of federal question jurisdiction pursuant to the Holmes test in the
context of § 1331 showcases this disconnect. As noted above, federal juris-
diction under § 1331 is not federal creation jurisdiction266 -it is meant to
encircle more situations than just where federal law creates the cause of
action. Thus, federal question jurisdiction in this context was bifurcated to
include situations where substantial federal questions are embedded in the
lawsuit. The Court in Grable specifically noted it was a "commonsense"
conclusion that issues of federal law, even if draped in a state law cloak,
should be heard in federal court.267
If it is commonsense that federal issues embedded in state law causes
of action should be heard in federal court, it should be obvious that lawsuits
where copyright issues are involved should be heard in the federal forum,
even if they are couched in state law causes of action. Congress has consist-
ently expressed its intent to have copyright issues heard in the federal fo-
rum-as early as 1870, Congress passed a statute that provided federal
courts with exclusive jurisdiction over copyright matters.268 Against this
background, it seems clear that artful pleading should not be used to pre-
vent federal courts from hearing lawsuits involving issues of copyright.
To redress the downfalls of the well-pleaded complaint rule and afford
due consideration to congressional concerns, courts need only modify their
present jurisdictional analysis in two ways. First, upon recognizing that the
265 Id. at 818-19.
266 Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng'g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 314 (2005).
267 id,
268 Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, §§ 55, 106, 16 Stat. 198, 206, 215.
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subject matter of the complaint concerns a copyright, courts should refrain
from making a jurisdictional declaration until after the defendant has sub-
mitted his answer or counterclaims. Second, the court should then examine
both the complaint and answer to decide whether any portion of the plain-
tiffs relief or defendant's counterclaim requires construction of the Copy-
right Act or an interpretation of the underlying copyright. If so, jurisdiction
is vested in the federal courts. If not, state courts can properly exercise ju-
risdiction over the case.
The recommendation that courts switch from the well-pleaded com-
plaint test to a substantive analysis of both the complaint and answer is nec-
essary to promote judicial efficiency, ensure access to a federal forum, and
encourage uniform interpretations of the Copyright Act. By implementing
these two procedural changes in the copyright context, courts are forced to
analyze the policies behind copyright jurisdiction instead of employing a
formal, rigid analysis that ignores congressional goals."9 Congress has
made clear that copyright law implicates national interests-particularly
through amendment of section 301 (a) of the Copyright Act to preempt "all
state laws conferring rights equivalent to those protected by federal copy-
right law."27 Thus, any approach relying solely on the plaintiffs crafty
allegations conflicts with congressional intent."' The national interests un-
derlying copyright jurisdiction are not so minimal that they should be
brushed aside. Rather, it is time for courts to acknowledge the insufficiency
of the well-pleaded complaint test and modify the rule to correctly deter-
mine jurisdiction.
A. Prong One: Waiting for an Answer
Postponing the jurisdictional analysis until after the defendant has
submitted his answer or counterclaim(s) ensures that state courts are not
incidentally interpreting the Copyright Act. While the plaintiff can creative-
ly plead his causes of action to avoid outright federal jurisdiction, the de-
fendant may expose the lurking copyright claim that must be incidentally
addressed to afford the plaintiff relief. The current well-pleaded complaint
rule ignores the possibility of an anticipated copyright defense,272 and leaves
state courts in charge of interpreting the Copyright Act in such situations.
269 See Cohen, supra note 2 at 379 (encouraging "courts to consider the policies underlying federal
question jurisdiction in determining whether a particular case should be heard in a federal court").
270 Id. at 379-80.
271 See Ferris v. General Dynamics Corp., 645 F. Supp. 1354, 1358 (D.R.I. 1986) ("The jurisdic-
tion of the federal district courts cannot be manipulated by the simple expedient of creative labelling.").
272 The Fair v. Kohler Die & Specialty Co., 228 U.S. 22, 25 (1913); Ratner, Survey, supra note 9,
at 972 ("A defendant with a valid federal counterclaim could be denied a federal forum and federal
copyright remedies."); see Birrer, Note, supra note 9, at 290 ("Facts introduced subsequent to the plead-
ings phase of the proceeding, however, may reveal that the plaintiff failed to raise a copyright claim.").
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Relying solely on the plaintiffs allegations thus hinders the courts from
sufficiently considering whether copyright issues are essential to the cause
of action and ignores whether federal statutory construction is warranted.273
Given that careful pleading of a suit can guarantee state court jurisdic-
tion, state courts are inevitably ruling on federal law without having devel-
oped expertise in applying that law. 274 The well-pleaded complaint rule ig-
nores the possibility of overbroad state interpretations of federal law and is
"indifferent to the possibilities of local prejudice against federal law. '275 By
permitting state judiciaries to decipher copyright law, qualified federal
judges are removed from essential debates over federal law and inexperi-
enced state judges are awarded the task of federal statutory interpretation.
The result is an utter lack of uniformity and predictability on the subject
matter, in contravention of congressional intent.
Requiring courts to defer a final jurisdictional decision until after the
defendant answers illustrates a strong commitment towards consistency in
copyright law. By analyzing both the complaint and answer, courts can
easily determine whether the Copyright Act is implicated in the underlying
action or whether the claim is purely based on state law. If the defendant's
answer or counterclaim demonstrates a need for interpretation of the Copy-
right Act, then federal courts can easily acquire jurisdiction at the outset of
the case and avoid the need for state courts to determine incidental copy-
right claims. However, if the defendant's answer reveals that the plaintiffs
action is completely subsumed under state law, federal courts can decline
jurisdiction and prevent purely state law claims from entering the federal
courthouse. This approach ensures that federal disputes are adjudicated in
federal courts, irrespective of which pleading contains the federal claim.276
However, supporters of the well-pleaded complaint rule maintain that
the jurisdictional determination must be made at the absolute beginning of
the case to avoid ambiguity and confusion.277 According to these scholars,
the efficiency of the judicial system depends on an immediate understand-
ing of jurisdiction that should not be influenced, in any manner, by the de-fendant's answer. 2 8 By deciding jurisdiction at the outset, litigants alleged-
ly spend less money and time on procedural questions. 9 While practical
efficiency and clarity are commendable in a jurisdictional analysis, these
273 See Cohen, supra note 2, at 373-74.
274 See Doemberg, supra note 187, at 650 (discussing the need for federal courts to apply federal
law).
275 Id.
276 See id. at 661 ("This furthers the policies underlying the creation of federal question jurisdic-
tion, policies that are ill served by a rule that arbitrarily consigns important federal issues to the state
courts because they happen to appear in the 'wrong' pleading.").
277 Foxrun Workshop, Ltd. v. Klone Mfg., Inc., 686 F. Supp. 86, 90 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); Wanat,
supra note 127, at 394.
278 See Foxrun Workshop, 686 F. Supp. at 90.
279 Cohen, supra note 2, at 340-41.
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are not the primary goals Congress sought to achieve through copyright
jurisdiction. Congress was not attempting to simplify arising under jurisdic-
tion by providing federal courts with exclusive power over copyright
claims; rather, Congress was trying to achieve national uniformity in inter-
pretation and protect against antifederal bias.50
Title 28 U.S.C. § 1454 is also instructive here. That section provides
that:
A civil action in which any party asserts a claim for relief arising under any Act of Con-
gress relating to patents, plant variety protection, or copyrights may be removed to the dis-
trict court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place where the ac-
tion is pending.
28 1
This language removes the normal counterclaim bar to federal jurisdic-
tion and allows removal of cases in which defendants have asserted a claim
arising under the copyright laws. This section creates an interesting dilem-
ma. If the defendant removes a lawsuit to the federal court based on arising
under jurisdiction pursuant to § 1338 before answering and fails, the case
will be remanded. However, the case can be removed again if the defendant
asserts a counterclaim that arises under the copyright laws.
The inefficiency here is best explained by an example from the patent
context. In TransCardiac Therapeutics, Inc. v. Yoganathan,2 82 the defendant
removed the case, only for the court to determine that the breach of contract
claim alleged in the complaint did not arise under § 1338.2"3 The court re-
manded, and the defendant removed the case again after asserting a coun-
terclaim that sought a declaratory judgment of patent inventorship in the
patent that formed the basis of the breach of contract claim.2"4 The lawsuit
ultimately raised patent issues,285 but the procedural circus that was required
to reach that conclusion could have been easily avoided.
Through § 1338 and § 1454, Congress recognized the national inter-
ests at stake in copyright claims and enforced a policy determination that
federal judges were better equipped to address these actions than state
courts." 6 Although the well-pleaded complaint rule offers a straightforward
application for jurisdiction, it does so at the expense of the underlying poli-
cy goals that raise the jurisdictional question in the first place. When com-
pared with the risk of undervaluing and ignoring the reasons why federal
280 Id. at 342, 380.
281 28 U.S.C. § 1454 (2012) (emphasis added).
282 TransCardiac Therapeutics, Inc. v. Yoganathan, 15 F. Supp. 3d 1364 (N.D. Ga. 2014).
283 Id. at 1375.
284 TransCardiac Therapeutics, Inc. v. Yoganathan, 85 F. Supp. 3d 1351 (N.D. Ga. 2014).
285 Id. at 1357.
286 In fact, "Congress recognized a need for federal courts to decide matters of patent and copyright




copyright jurisdiction was developed, waiting an additional twenty-one to
sixty days 287 to determine jurisdiction is a minimal imposition on the par-
ties-especially given that a motion for removal can occur within thirty
days of the plaintiffs complaint.288 Therefore, the form and substance of the
plaintiffs complaint alone are insufficient bases upon which to determine
jurisdiction. The countervailing congressional policy decisions require reas-
surance that "plaintiffs do not get away with concealing the federal nature
of their claims," particularly where federal jurisdiction is exclusive. 289 Thus,
analysis of the defendant's answer and counterclaim(s) is warranted.
B. Prong Two. Examining the Pleadings
After waiting for the defendant to submit his answer or counter-
claim(s), the court should next examine the pleadings to determine whether
any count for relief or defense requires (1) construction of the Copyright
Act, (2) analysis of the underlying copyright itself, or (3) relief explicitly
provided under the Copyright Act. This approach does not require courts to
make in-depth factual findings or conduct hearings on the facts. Rather,
courts must decide, strictly on the face of the pleadings, whether a construc-
tion of the federal Copyright Act is required to adjudicate the claims. By
looking at the nature of the claims and defenses asserted, the judiciary regu-
lates the types of copyright actions state courts can hear. Because Congress
did not preempt all state claims involving copyright matters,29 ° it is neces-
sary to decipher whether the cases presented to the courts require federal
statutory construction or federal relief. If so, jurisdiction is exclusively fed-
eral. However, if the claim does not require interpretation of the Copyright
Act or underlying copyright, then state courts may assert jurisdiction de-
pending on the nature of the claim. 9'
This analysis of whether statutory construction of the Copyright Act is
required to award relief bypasses the primary problem associated with the
essence and Sho . tsts-namely, that a jurisdictional determination
is a de facto adjudication on the merits of the copyright claim.292 By simply
examining the pleadings to decide whether the Copyright Act is implicated,
courts are not engaging in the difficult banter of whether a copyright claim
287 FED. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(1)(A) (requiring a defendant to serve an answer within twenty-one days
after receiving the summons and complaint or, if service has been timely waived, within sixty days after
the request for waiver was sent).
288 28 U.S.C. § 1446 (2012) (stating that the defendant must file a notice of removal in a civil
action within thirty days after receiving a copy of the summons or complaint).
289 Saturday Evening Post Co. v. Rumbleseat Press, Inc., 816 F.2d 1191, 1195 (7th Cir. 1987).
290 Cohen, supra note 2, at 381.
291 See Berger v. Simon & Schuster, 631 F. Supp. 915, 917 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (declining jurisdiction
where nothing in the case required construction of the Copyright Act).
292 See Birrer, Note, supra note 9, at 285, 293; see also Beam, Comment, supra note 2, at 409.
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is "incidental to" a state law claim; 293 instead, courts must solely determine
if any count of the complaint or defense requires construction of the Copy-
right Act or seeks relief expressly provided under the Act. Ruling that no
construction of the Copyright Act is necessary would not foreclose the pos-
sibility of a viable copyright claim; it would merely grant state courts juris-
diction over that claim (assuming the claim for relief is not provided by the
Copyright Act) because no federal interest is implicated.
Furthermore, requiring a cursory examination of the pleadings ensures
that the dispute is before the proper court. Currently, the well-pleaded com-
plaint rule suffers from its inability to remove a federal defense to federal
court, thus leaving state courts to decipher federal law. Dismissal by the
state court on jurisdictional grounds based on facts deduced subsequent to
the complaint is improper under the well-pleaded complaint test, even if
those facts show a substantial federal copyright question.294 However, by
briefly reading the complaint and answer, courts can quickly determine
whether the plaintiff seeks federal relief under the Copyright Act or wheth-
er any cause of action will foreseeably require interpretation of the Act.
This approach is less complex and confusing than the essence test, which
mandated that courts determine the essence or heart of the dispute. Here,
the courts do not weigh the causes of action, but rather discern whether the
Copyright Act is implicated in any claim.295 Thus, this framework offers a
sharper distinction between the jurisdictional analysis and a decision on the
merits of the complaint.
Through an examination of the pleadings, courts are better able to iso-
late the cases that require federal jurisdiction and promote uniformity in
interpretation of the Copyright Act. The likelihood of a plaintiff artfully
pleading a copyright claim as a state law cause of action to avoid federal
jurisdiction diminishes when courts are able to examine both the complaint
and answer. The national interests underlying copyright jurisdiction are too
great to be manipulated by plaintiffs, and state courts should not be forced
to interpret federal statutes where they lack expertise. By merely waiting
until the answer is filed and glancing at the nature of the relief and defens-
es, courts can quickly determine whether the case will likely require federal
relief or interpretation. It is only by eliminating the well-pleaded complaint
rule that the congressional goals underlying copyright jurisdiction can be
accomplished.
293 Beam, Comment, supra note 2, at 409.
294 Wanat, supra note 127, at 394.
295 Id. at 395 (arguing that a federal court should decline jurisdiction "only when the court is per-




The intersection between copyright issues and federal question juris-
diction may be knotty, but it is a question that must be unraveled. Indeed,
cases implicating concerns of intellectual property are one of the fastest
growing and most pressing issues in the federal courts.296 As the importance
of intellectual property continues to grow, it becomes imperative that juris-
dictional uncertainty is removed.
Although the well-pleaded complaint rule has long been the bench-
mark by which copyright jurisdiction under § 1338 is assessed, that rule
should no longer control. The well-pleaded complaint rule leaves too many
opportunities for a plaintiff to choose to stay in state court despite having
initiated a lawsuit that likely implicates the congressional policy considera-
tions behind exclusive federal jurisdiction. Plaintiffs that seek contractual
remedies or provide an alternate theory of recovery are particularly likely to
be able to avoid removal thanks to artful pleading. To avoid jurisdictional
gamesmanship it is thus critical that courts wait for an answer before as-
sessing the presence of arising under jurisdiction under § 1338.
Although waiting for an answer is the antithesis of the normal para-
digm for determining arising under jurisdiction, an exception should be
made in the copyright arena. If Congress truly values the exclusive jurisdic-
tion of the federal courts in this sphere, then courts should be allowed suffi-
cient opportunity to scan lawsuits for copyright issues. Further, if federal
jurisdiction already exists by statute for a defendant's counterclaim, it is
inefficient to remand a lawsuit only to remove it less than thirty days later.
As such, the proposed test removes uncertainty for the parties, promotes
efficiency for the courts, and gives appropriate weight to the congressional
determination that copyright issues are within the exclusive purview of the
federal courts.
296 Birrer, Note, supra note 9, at 271.
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